# EIGHT VIEWS,

REPRESENTING THE MANŒUVRES OF THE

# ENGLISH AND FRENCH FLEETS

## On the Memorable 27th of JULY, 1778,

WITHOUT WHICH A CLEAR IDEA OF THE ENGAGEMENT, AND THE OPERATIONS OF BOTH FLEETS, BEFORE AND AFTER IT, CANNOT POSSIBLY BE FORMED.

ACCOMPANIED BY

A full and exact Account of the PROCEEDINGS of the TWO FLEETS, from the 23d of the ſame Month, when they firſt came in Sight of each other, to the 28th, when the FRENCH had gone off towards BREST.

---

LONDON,

Printed for J. BEW, in PATER-NOSTER-ROW,

MDCCLXXIX.

# ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Deſign of the following VIEWS, &c. is to convey a clear Idea of the Engagement between the *Engliſh* and *French* Fleets, and of the Manœuvres attending it. Few Matters have engroſſed ſuch general Converſation, which were at the ſame Time ſo little underſtood. To have the whole Proceedings of the two Fleets from their firſt falling in with each other, but particularly on the 27th of *July*, diſplayed in a perſpicuous, ſtriking Manner, cannot, therefore, but be acceptable to the Public.—With reſpect to Sir *Hugh Palliſer*, due Care has been taken to repreſent his Conduct juſt as it appeared, without the leaſt Attempt to juſtify or condemn it; that being the proper Buſineſs of the naval Tribunal before which he will ſoon be brought to ſolemn Trial.

It has been judged ſuperfluous to pay a ſcrupulous Regard to the *Number* of Ships in the VIEWS, except the Fifth; as it would only have unneceſſarily crowded the Pages.

# EIGHT VIEWS, &c.

EARLY in July the Hon. Auguſtus Keppel put to ſea with the following ſhips of the line, beſides frigates, fireſhips, &c.

| *Diviſion of Sir Robert Harland, Vice-Admiral of the Red.* | |
|---|---|
| Monarch, | Capt. Rowley. |
| Hector, | Sir John Hamilton. |
| Exeter, | Capt. Nott. |
| Centaur, | Capt. Croſby. |
| Duke, | Capt. Brereton. |
| Queen, | Vice-Adm. Sir Robert Harland, Capt. Preſcot. |
| Shrewſbury, | Sir J. Lockhart Roſs. |
| Cumberland, | Capt. Peyton. |
| Berwick, | Hon. Keith Stewart. |
| Stirling Caſtle, | Sir Charles Douglas. |

| *Diviſion of Admiral Keppel, Commander in Chief.* | |
|---|---|
| Courageux, | Rt. Hon. Ld. Mulgrave. |
| Thunderer, | Hon. Boyle Walſingham. |
| Vigilant, | Capt. Kingſmill. |
| Sandwich, | Capt. Edwards. |
| Valiant, | Hon. Leveſon Gower. |
| Victory, | Admiral Keppel, Rear Adm. Campbell, Capt. Falconer. |
| Foudroyant, | Capt. Jarvis. |
| Prince George, | Sir J. Lindſay, K. B. |
| Beinfaiſant, | Capt. M'Bride. |
| Vengeance, | Capt. Clements. |

| *Diviſion of Sir Hugh Palliſer, Vice-Admiral of the Blue.* | |
|---|---|
| Worceſter, | Capt. Robinſon. |
| Elizabeth, | Hon. F. Maitland. |
| Defiance, | Capt. Goodall. |
| Robuſte, | Capt. Hood. |
| Formidable, | Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliſer, Capt. Bazely. |
| Ocean, | Capt. Laforey. |
| America, | Rt. Hon. Ld. Longford. |
| Terrible, | Sir Richard Bickerton. |
| Egmont, | Capt. Allen. |
| Ramillies, | Hon. Robert Digby. |

About one o'clock in the afternoon of the 23d of July, on the clearing-up of the weather, which had been hazy, the French fleet was diſcovered in the N. E. quarter, to leeward, at about three leagues diſtance, between the Engliſh and Breſt, and ſteering rather towards the Engliſh fleet. It conſiſted of 32 ſail of the line, and

was

was commmanded by the Count D'Orvilliers, aſſiſted by the Duke de Chartres and the Count Duchauffault. Their ſituation was about 30 leagues N. W. of Breſt.

Without any previous endeavours to diſcover each other's ſtrength, the Commanders of both fleets were eager to form the line of battle; for, as it is natural to ſuppoſe on a cruize, their reſpective ſhips were much extended. The operation, therefore, was tedious: Admiral Keppel, however, having at length compleated his line, brought to for the night, with the intention, no doubt, of bearing down upon the enemy next morning. But the Count D'Orvilliers did not chuſe to leave it at his option ſo to do. When night came on, he tacked about, and by dint of ſail, and the wind ſhifting ſomewhat in his favour, he was ſeen, at day-light next morning, not in the N. E. as at firſt, but in the N. W. quarter; a ſituation which, though it deprived him of his direct communication with Breſt, yet gave him the advantage of the wind, whereby he could eaſily find means to keep his enemy at bay.

This conduct of the Count D'Orvilliers, in placing the Engliſh fleet between his own and Breſt, has given riſe to ſome ſpeculation. Sir Hugh Palliſer, on the late trial of Admiral Keppel, endeavoured to eſtabliſh an inference from it, that the Count intended to come to action; but ſuch inference is not warranted by conſequent fact. The tranſition ſhews, indeed, the Admiral's intention of keeping the ſea; but that ſeems to be all: or, if he had at firſt any inclination to an engagement, it is plain that with his change of poſition he changed alſo his mind.

It may be aſked, For what purpoſe, then, unleſs to fight, were the French deſirous of keeping the ſea? Count D'Orvilliers himſelf could, doubtleſs, anſwer this queſtion beſt: however, we are not without ſome clue to the motives of his conduct, inconſiſtent as it may ſeem. It is well-known, that no pains nor expence were ſpared by the French Government to equip the naval armament under his command: it was better manned, and better appointed in every reſpect, than any ever fitted out by that nation before; and the ideas of the people were raiſed to ſuch a pitch, that they began to entertain hopes even of its riding triumphant in the Channel. Amid theſe high-ſtrained expectations, what would have been the conſequence, if, upon firſt ſight of his enemy, the French Admiral had precipitately ſteered into port? Certainly, national indignation, and, probably, the loſs of his own life;—evils which every one will allow it behoved him, if poſſible, to avoid. With this view he reſolved to endeavour to gain the advantage of a windward ſituation, and to maintain the ſame, either ſeriouſly to bear down upon the Engliſh, if he ſhould ſee any probability of ſucceſs, or to keep aloof and watch any opportunity to have a bruſh with them off their guard,—or, at leaſt, till the Chapter of Accidents ſhould furniſh him with ſome *plauſible pretence* of returning to Breſt without it. Granted it may be, on one hand, that, in the afternoon of the 23d, before he had reconnoitred his enemy, his purpoſe was to come to an engagement; but it muſt be granted likewiſe, on the other hand, that, after receiving the report of the frigate La Senſible, which he ſent out to learn what force he had to cope with, his courage was ſucceeded by a prudential fear that kept him from action ſo long as it was in his power to follow its dictates.

Upon diſcovering, on the morning of the 24th, this change in the ſituation of the French fleet, that their diſtance was increaſed, and that the Engliſh fleet were ſtill loſing ground by ſailing in a line, Admiral Keppel diſcontinued

discontinued

diſcontinued the ſignal for that purpoſe, and ordered a general chace to windward, whilſt the French were endeavouring to form their line, and at the ſame time keeping their wind and going off. Their efforts had been exerted to ſuch a degree, and the wind ſo violent during the preceding night, that not only moſt of their ſhips were now much diſperſed, but three of them were conſiderably to leeward, one of which had carried away her fore-top-maſt. Capt. M'Bride, of the Beinfaiſant, remarking theſe circumſtances, and ſuppoſing, as the weather was hazy, they might eſcape the notice of Admiral Keppel, went on board the Victory to acquaint him with his obſervations. The Admiral immediately conceived the idea either of ſeparating thoſe leeward ſhips entirely from the body of the French fleet, or of bringing on a general action, if Count D'Orvilliers ſhould think fit to protect them: whereupon, Capt. M'Bride received orders immediately to give the proper chace himſelf, and to require Capt. Maitland, of the Elizabeth, to join in it; and they were not to return without particular ſignals, even though that for the line ſhould be thrown out. A due execution followed theſe directions, though not with all the hoped-for ſucceſs, as a ſhift of wind prevented the ſhip which had loſt her fore-top-maſt from being taken: the two others, viz. the Duke de Burgoyne, of 80 guns, and the Alexandre of 64, were entirely ſeparated, and ſheered off to the S. E. with all the canvas they could crowd, the French Admiral not chuſing to hazard the reſt to recover them:---an incontrovertible proof this, that his intention to fight, if he had had any, no longer exiſted. The Engliſh continued to chace with as preſſed a ſail as the keeping the fleet in a body would admit: the French ſtudiouſly avoided their purſuers by monœuvring to form a line, and a vigorous exertion to keep the wind, which in the afternoon gradually ſhifted from W. N. W. to W. S. W. and for that end at night they ſet their top-gallant ſails.

Nothing remarkable happened during the two next days: the Engliſh ſtill continued to uſe every means to get up with the enemy, who betrayed equal anxiety in maintaining their diſtance, and at the ſame time beating up their ſtraggling and leewardmoſt ſhips.

We come now to the memorable 27th of July, when at day-light the wind was at S. W. and the reſpective poſition of the two fleets as follows:

VIEW I. *repreſenting the reſpective Poſition of the* Engliſh *and* French *Fleets at Four o'Clock in the Morning of* July 27, 1778.

WEST.

*French Fleet, cloſe-hauled on the Larboard Tack, ſtanding to the N. W.*

Wind at S.W.




SOUTH.

NORTH.

*Engliſh Fleet on the Larboard Tack.*




EAST.

---

The French fleet was at about ſeven miles diſtance, on the larboard tack, cloſe hauled, and though ſeemingly in a line, yet going off with the ſame induſtry as before. The Engliſh fleet, which was alſo on the larboard tack, had preſſed on with an ardour that occaſioned the ſhips to be rather extended from each other; whence it happened that ſome of thoſe of the center diviſion had joined themſelves to that of the Vice-Admiral of the Red, and that there was a conſiderable interval between the Victory (then the leewardmoſt ſhip of the center) and the diviſion of the Vice-Admiral of the Blue. To fill up this interval without calling back the advanced ſhips of

of the center diviſion, and to ſtrengthen and unite the main body of the fleet with the Blue diviſion, in caſe the enemy could be forced to action, particular ſignals were made for ſix ſhips of the latter, viz. the Terrible, Robuſte, Elizabeth, Egmont, Worceſter, and America, to chace to windward. Indeed, it was only by ſome exertion of this kind that there was any probability of obtaining the principal object in view—an engagement.

Count D'Orvilliers, perceiving the ſtrenuous efforts of the Engliſh Admiral to near him, thought proper between eight and nine o'clock to have recourſe, as uſual, to manœuvring, and accordingly ordered his fleet to tack and wear ſucceſſively in each other's wakes; which they did, and ſtood to the ſouthward, on the ſtarboard tack, cloſe hauled.

---

VIEW II. *repreſenting the* Engliſh *and* French *Fleets at Half an Hour after Nine, when the latter had changed its Courſe and got on the Starboard Tack.*







---

The French had no ſooner executed this manœuvre, than the wind veered ſomewhat more to the South; which induced the Engliſh Admiral to ſtand on till a quarter paſt ten, when ſome of the chacing ſhips having ſtretched pretty far a-head, he wore his fleet all together by ſignal, and ſtood after the enemy, on the ſtarboard tack.

VIEW

VIEW III. *repreſenting the* Engliſh *and* French *Fleets at Half an Hour after Ten, when both were on the Starboard Tack, the* Engliſh *purſuing the* French.

*French Fleet continuing on the Starboard Tack.*




*Engliſh Fleet, now come all together on the Starboard Tack, and purſuing the French.*




---

Soon after the Engliſh fleet had thus tacked about after the French, Admiral Keppel had the ſatisfaction of perceiving the wind to come two points in its favour to the weſtward, which enabled it to lie up for a part of the French. And now aroſe a dark ſquall which intercepted the ſight from one fleet to the other for half-an-hour. The French Admiral, however, had before obſerved the laſt-mentioned operation of his enemy; and, rightly judging that from the ſhift of wind to the weſtward, and from the advancement of the Engliſh fleet, that a part of his own, if he continued in his preſent courſe, would unavoidably be expoſed to its attack, conceived, that the beſt means of eſcaping the danger would be to tack about once more, altogether, preſerving the line of battle inverted, and, if poſſible, by keeping his wind, ſteer clear of his purſuers; or, if that ſhould be found impracticable, he could, at all events, ſeize the opportunity of meeting them unawares, and, extended as they were, engage them with an advantage that he might otherwiſe expect in vain. Beſides, there was another reaſon (and that, perhaps, not a feeble one) for the Count D'Orvilliers' giving into this deſign; the action (if there muſt be one) would be but *ſhort*, if he ſhould put about again on the larboard tack; whereas, if he ſhould continue on the ſtarboard tack, it was not in his power to foreſee the end of it. He very prudently, therefore, reſolved to wear a ſecond time, and, what was neceſſary to be done, to do quickly.

At

At eleven o'clock the ſquall cleared up, which diſcovered the French buſily employed in this manœuvre, and in forming a line; but whether from too much hurry, or a timid perturbation, ariſing from the near approach of the Engliſh, they were not able to do it but in an irregular manner, the ſhips by no means ſailing in one another's wakes, the diſtance between them being very unequal, and the Admirals of the center and rear diviſions within one ſhip of each other. In performing the laſt operation, they had, moreover, fallen ſomewhat to leeward, which abſolutely put it out of their power to prevent the Engliſh cloſing with their rear. Count D'Orvilliers, therefore, had no alternative but expoſing and deſerting that part of his fleet, or covering and ſupporting it with the reſt. Both honour and courage called upon him to do the laſt, and he, with the center diviſion, edged down accordingly: the van, however, commanded by the Duke de Chartres, ſtill keept its wind, and bore up as much as the preſervation of the line, imperfect as it has been deſcribed, would allow.

The two fleets, being on different tacks, approached one another very faſt. At a quarter after eleven the headmoſt ſhips of their reſpective vans were within cannon-ſhot; when (though neither fleet had yet hoiſted colours) thoſe of the French began firing on the Engliſh, who inſtantly returned it; and then, and not before, Admiral Keppel threw out the ſignal for battle.

---

VIEW IV. *repreſenting the Two Fleets at a Quarter after Eleven, when the Engagement commenced as they began to paſs each other on contrary Tacks.*




---

Notwithſtanding the ſudden and unexpected manner in which the French came to an engagement, the greater part of the Engliſh fleet entered into it in a tolerably well-connected body; and the reſt (excepting a ſhip or two, ſo far to leeward as to have little or no ſhare therein,) were of mutual ſupport to one another in as great a degree as could poſſibly be expected from the means by which alone the action with ſo unwilling an enemy could be brought on at all.

As

At eleven o'clock the signal cleared up, which discovered the French half employed in their rear, and in forming a line; but whether from too much hurry, or a dread perturbation, acting upon the per[illegible] of the Loyalty, they were not able to do it but with a very irregular manner. The ships by no means luffing in one anothe[illegible]r's wakes, the distance between them being very unequal, and the Admirals of the centre and rear[illegible]s within one ship of each other. In performing the last operation, they shot ahead, however, taken forward to leeward, which absolutely prevented their power to prevent the Loyalty cutting with their rear. Count D'O[illegible]villiers, therefore, had no alternative but cutting and clearing their port of his fleet, or covering it by posting it with the rest. Both these and others called upon him to do the last, and he, with the centre division, edged down accordingly to the van, however contended by the Duke de Chartres, that keep to wind and bore up as much as the circumstances of the line, imperfect as it was then described, would allow.

The two fleets, being on different tacks, approached one another very fast. As a counter stroke to those of the French began firing on the Loyalty, who instantly returned it; and then one after another. Admiral Keppel threw out the signal for battle.

---

VIEW IV. representing the Three Fleets at a Quarter after Three, when the Engagement commenced in the Evening.

---

Count Douglas.

Count Vaudreuil.

---

Notwithstanding the fallen and unexpected manner in which the French appeared to the English fleet entered into it in a tolerably well-regulated body, and the van part of the to leeward as to have little or no fleet thereby was of mutual support to as could possibly be expected from the means by which alone the ships with it brought on at all.

As the fleets proceeded along-ſide on contrary tacks, they gave and received each other's fire. All the ſhips, however, were not equally engaged; for few but thoſe which had been ordered to chace in the morning could get near enough the French van (which bore up) to do execution: and, therefore, though many were fired at as they paſſed it at a conſiderable diſtance, the Engliſh Captains did not, Frenchmen-like, return the random ſhot; but from that part of the enemy's line, which from their ſeveral ſituations they were able to fetch with effect, they went on engaging till they had paſſed the rear. The Victory fetched a little a-head of the Bretagne (Count D'Orvilliers' ſhip), and began to engage her with the impetuoſity truly characteriſtic of the Admiral who was on board. In ſhort, every Engliſh ſhip fetched as high as poſſible; and the manner in which they fought indicated the true Old Engliſh courage in their commanders.

Agreeable to their uſual policy, the French had made it their chief object to diſable the Engliſh ſhips by firing for the moſt part at their rigging. Thus it happened, that, though all of them were in a condition to maintain an action with an enemy who ſhould be willing to fight along-ſide, yet there were none but had received ſo much damage as rendered it highly imprudent, if not abſolutely impracticable, for them to wear and ſeek a freſh attack without refitting. Hence, they were all neceſſitated to ſtand to the Southward, on the ſtarboard tack, a longer or ſhorter time, according to the injury ſuſtained, till they had undergone ſome temporary repairs; ſo that whilſt ſome were under management within half an hour or an hour, others, which were forced to fall to leeward, could not recover themſelves in leſs than four or five. Sir Robert Harland, who commanded the van diviſion, which, in general, ſeems to have received the leaſt injury, went out of action about half an hour after twelve o'clock; and ſoon afterwards, with the greater part of his diviſion, wore to windward, and ſtood after the enemy on the larboard tack. Admiral Keppel, who began to engage at a quarter before twelve, and paſſed the rear of the French about one o'clock, made the ſignal within ten minutes after for the center diviſion to wear and get on the larboard tack; but in vain: nay, he could not wear himſelf till a quarter before two, and then was not followed immediately by a ſingle ſhip of the center diviſion. The reſt of the fleet, at this period, were either ſtanding on, or bringing to, and refitting; the firing now ceaſing by the Vice Admiral of the Blue and his diviſion coming clear of the enemy, who ſtill kept in a line on the larboard tack. Though the French had not apparently ſuffered ſo much in their rigging as the Engliſh, they doubtleſs ſuſtained more injury in their hulls and loſs of men. One large ſhip that had loſt her main-yard and main-top-ſail, was ſeen to quit their fleet at half an hour after two, going before the wind, attended by a frigate.

Of the ſcattered ſtate of the Engliſh fleet juſt after the action, the reader will conceive a better idea from the following View.

VIEW

## VIEW V. *repreſenting the* Engliſh *Fleet juſt after the Engagement.*




The Engliſh Admiral ſaw with pain the crippled and ſcattered ſtate of his fleet, and had no ſooner worn and got upon the larboard tack (as above related) than he diſcontinued the ſignal for battle, and made that for the line a-head, as the moſt likely means of collecting the ſhips together as faſt as they were able to obey it: he then kept ſtanding on in a direct line towards the French fleet, with the intent to re-attack it as ſoon as a ſufficient number of ſhips had got into their ſtations.

It was at this period that Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliſer, in the Formidable, and Capt. Robinſon, of the Worceſter, ſeeing Admiral Keppel thus advancing, wore their ſhips, though they had received very great injury, and laid their heads towards the enemy: but the French afterwards beginning to break up their old line, and to form a new one ſeemingly pointing towards them, both the Vice-Admiral and Capt. Robinſon thought proper to wear thoſe ſhips back again.

In ſtanding towards the French fleet Admiral Keppel had the mortification to find himſelf quite unſupported: three or four ſhips, indeed, wore ſoon after the Victory, and appeared at a diſtance coming up, but none within a mile; ſo that he was obliged to ſlacken ſail, as well to let them come up, as to give others time to refit. Nevertheleſs,

vertheleſs, at three o'clock, he had paſſed the Formidable to windward, which ſhip was now ſtanding on the ſtarboard tack with her head to the ſouthward, notwithſtanding the ſignal for the line of battle a-head was flying on board the Admiral on the larboard tack, on which the Blue (Sir Hugh Palliſer's) diviſion was to take the lead. In the mean time (as before obſerved) the French had begun to break up their line, in which there was ſome appearance of confuſion, occaſioned by a miſconception in the Duke de Chartres of the ſignal made by Count D'Orvilliers for forming a new one. But an explanation ſoon taking place, they proceeded by ſending out their ſhips, as it were, from a collected body, one by one, on the ſtarboard tack, by the wind. This direction, if purſued, would have brought them cloſe up with the Victory; which ſhip was now the neareſt of the whole Engliſh fleet to the enemy.

---

VIEW VI. *repreſenting the* Engliſh *and* French *Fleets, at Three o'Clock, when the latter had begun to form their Line on the Starboard Tack.*




---

Admiral Keppel, obſerving the general incapacity of the Blue diviſion to wear and form in the line a-head on the larboard tack, was on the point of ſending orders to Sir Robert Harland to take the lead in their room with the ſhips he had with him; but juſt as he was diſpatching the Captain of the Proſerpine to Sir Robert for that purpoſe, he remarked that the French had begun to deviate from their firſt direction, and to point to leeward towards

towards four diſabled ſhips which were at a diſtance repairing their damages. The moment was critical—the danger manifeſt—To prevent it, the Admiral moſt judiciouſly dropped his deſign of forming the line on the larboard tack, and adopted that of wearing and collecting his ſhips on the ſtarboard tack, at the ſame time ſtanding athwart the enemy's van in a diagonal courſe, ſo as to cover the diſabled ſhips to leeward, and prevent the enemy from "affronting" him (as he expreſſed it) by making an attack upon and ſeparating them from the reſt of the fleet, which was evidently their intention. And juſt as he was executing this very neceſſary manœuvre he diſpatched the Captain of the Proſerpine to Sir R. Harland, not with the meſſage to take the lead on the larboard tack, according to his former idea, but to wear and form his ſhips at a diſtance a-ſtern of the Victory, on the ſtarboard, in order to cover the rear, and keep the enemy in check, till the Vice-Admiral of the Blue and his diviſion ſhould come into their ſtation, agreeable to the ſignal for the line ſtill kept flying. Sir Robert, having obſerved how ill the Admiral was ſupported, was prepared for the meſſage; nay, was even meditating the ſame movement at all riſks: an immediate execution, therefore, enſued.

---

VIEW VII. *repreſenting the* Engliſh *Fleet at Three Quarters after Three, when Sir* Robert Harland's *Diviſion was ſituated a-ſtern of the* Victory, *and the* French *were forming their Line to Leeward.*




---

The manœuvre of the French in falling to leeward ſeems to be the counterpart of that of getting to windward in the night of the 23d of July. It has already been attempted to ſhew Count D'Orvilliers' motives for the firſt; a word or two may not be thought impertinent by way of accounting for the laſt.

The Count, indeed, profeſſes to have done it with the deſign of depriving the Engliſh of the advantage of "ſerving the firſt battery." But this is no leſs than a downright condemnation of his former conduct in ſo aſſiduouſly endeavouring to preſerve the wind, whereby he gave his enemy that very advantage. The moſt probable reaſon is, that, after having, in a manner, run the gantlet along-ſide the Engliſh fleet with a tolerable grace, he might again get between them and Breſt, to which port he thought he could venture to return after the bruſh he had juſt had, eſpecially as there was room to hope that the miſchief he had done the Engliſh in their rigging would put it out of their power during that day to prevent the gaſconade he had in contemplation,—the reforming his line; which circumſtance he conſidered as a ſufficient ſhield to ward off the cenſure of a vain-glorious nation, who thence would be eaſily cajoled into the belief of any plauſible, though falſe ſtory, he ſhould invent, to cover the ignominy of an intended retreat in the night.

From Admiral Keppel's wearing ſoon after the engagement, until the preſent time, "the moſt forcible of all ſignals, the ſignal for the line of battle," had been flying on board the Victory, to collect the ſhips together, in order to renew the attack; but it had not hitherto been complied with by the Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and, conſequently, none of the ſhips of his diviſion; though ſeveral of them had now begun to take their ſtations near their flag.

Here the ſubject becomes painful to the Writer, as it involves the relation of diſobedience to orders of the Commander in Chief; and that too on the part of an Officer of high rank who had a few hours before given indubitable proofs of valour. Plain matter of fact, however, muſt be recited; and that is all which, for an obvious reaſon, is yet proper for the public eye.

Admiral Keppel, finding himſelf unſupported in the protection of the diſabled ſhips by any of the Blue diviſion, and that the courſe he ſailed in for that purpoſe brought him nearer to the enemy, made, about three quarters of an hour paſt three, the ſignal for ſhips to windward to bear down into his wake; and, that it might be the better obſerved, hauled down for ten minutes that for the line of battle, both being ſignals at the mizen peak. The ſignal for ſhips to bear down the Vice-Admiral of the Blue repeated, though he is charged with not having repeated that for the line of battle: nevertheleſs, as he did not bear down himſelf accordingly, the Captains of his diviſion were led into an opinion, that, by his repeating it, they were required to bear down into *his* wake, inſtead of the Admiral's. When this ſignal had been out ten minutes, it was removed, and that for the line hoiſted again.

At half an hour after four the ſignal for ſhips to windward to bear down was made a ſecond time, without taking down that for the line; but with no better effect than before. Surprized at this non-obſervance of his ſignals, and anxious to re-engage the enemy's fleet, which ſtill continued to arrange itſelf in a parallel line to leeward, Admiral Keppel, about five o'clock, diſpatched the Captain of the Milford frigate to deſire Vice-Admiral Sir

Sir Robert Harland to ſtretch a-head with his diviſion, and take his proper place in the van; as alſo the Captain of the Fox to Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliſer, to acquaint him that the Admiral only waited for Sir Hugh and his diviſion's bearing down into his wake to renew the attack: at the ſame time the Admiral, after hauling down the ſignal for coming into his wake, ordered that for all ſhips to get into their ſtations to be hoiſted in its ſtead, always keeping up the ſignal for the line. The Red diviſion obeyed inſtantly; but not ſo the Blue, the Formidable making no viſible effort to get down; which neglect appears to have been utterly unaccountable on board the Victory at the time. At ſeven o'clock, Admiral Keppel, " wearied out with fruitleſs expectation" of a compliance with his expreſs meſſage and former ſignals, made, by way of *dernier reſſort*, the ſignal for each particular ſhip (the Formidable excepted from a point of delicacy) of the Blue diviſion to come into ſtation. Theſe ſignals were repeated by the Vice-Admiral; when ſeveral ſhips of his diviſion began to bear down into the line accordingly: but night overtook them in the operation, and put an end to all preſent deſigns againſt the enemy, the van of whoſe fleet was now advanced a-breaſt of the Victory, about two miles to leeward.

---

VIEW VIII. *repreſenting the Two Fleets at the Cloſe of the Evening, when Sir* Robert Harland's *Diviſion had taken its proper Station in the Van, and the Blue Diviſion was forming in the Rear;—the* French *Line being completed, and ranged in a parallel Direction to Leeward.*



Thus, at night, was the Formidable, with a part of the Blue diviſion, left about one mile to windward of the Victory's wake, and three a-ſtern; the Formidable ſteering in ſuch a manner as to keep the Victory a little open under her lee bow, which Sir Hugh Palliſer maintains to have been the proper courſe for taking her ſtation in the line as ſoon as ſhe ſhould be in a *manageable condition*. Whether the defects or injuries of Sir Hugh's ſhip were ſufficient to juſtify ſo ſeemingly ſtrange a conduct, is *a matter yet to be enquired into* by proper judges: it remains here only to ſtate one more fact concerning him; which is, that the Formidable was not in the line till very near day-light next morning.

But when that period arrived, the high expectations of the Engliſh of coming to action were converted into the greateſt aſtoniſhment, as their vaunting antagoniſts had ſheered off, and could only be deſcried from the maſt-head of part of the fleet. Two rockets, and ſome falſe fires, exhibited by them at midnight, were probably the ſignals for that *manœuvre*, which was very expertly executed, three ſhips being left to make a parade with their lights where the whole fleet was ſituated the evening before. The French Admiral has had the effrontery to charge the Engliſh with flight during the night of the 27th; but, if a doubt could poſſibly *now* remain on any perſon's mind, it would be a very eaſy matter to ſhew, from the circumſtance of the three ſhips remaining, and from the reſt being obſerved at a great diſtance, in a body, and not in line, as on the preceding night, that the ſtigma of *running-away* can only reſt on the French.

The above-mentioned three French ſhips were ordered to be chaced; but they were probably ſome of their beſt ſailers; and there appearing little or no likelihood of getting up with them, the chace was countermanded. The ſame reaſon held good againſt a general chace after the main body, as the fleet was in a crippled condition: Admiral Keppel, therefore, regardleſs of the empty glory of following, without hope of coming up with, an enemy flying into port, judged it more to his own real honour, and to the good of the ſervice, to return to England, in order that his ſhips might have a more thorough repair than it was poſſible to give them at ſea.

F I N I S